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21 
THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL 
Abstract 
Artificial intelligence has demonstrated the ability to outperform humans 
at tasks that were previously thought to offer a decisive advantage to 
human intelligence. Computer technology has already changed the practice 
of law in many ways. Lawyers may therefore wonder whether they will soon 
be replaced by computers. This Article looks at that issue from another 
direction, beginning with the nature of law as a means to enhance the 
human ethical capacity for reason-giving in response to demands for 
accountability. Moral reason-giving reflects the mutual recognition of two 
agents as free and equal. The law merely enables the process of giving 
reasons on a much larger scale, given background conditions of 
disagreement and uncertainty. The core function of lawyers is to facilitate 
the law’s practical authority, by interpreting and applying the law to give 
reasons that suffice to justify actions that affect the interests of others. The 
Article reviews the current state of research on machine ethics and the 
development of artificial moral agents and concludes that human 
technology is a long way from being able to design a computer system that 
can satisfy the demand for authority and accountability that is constitutive 
of the core function of lawyers in a liberal democratic political community. 
I. Introduction 
After years of hype about their potential,1 artificial intelligence (AI) 
systems have recently shown themselves capable of outperforming humans 
at tasks at which humans have long had a decisive advantage. The story of 
IBM’s Deep Blue beating Garry Kasparov at chess is familiar, as is the 
winning performance of the company’s Watson technology at Jeopardy. A 
bigger deal, however, is the victory of the AlphaGo system, built by 
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 1. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE 
PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS (2015); 
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Google’s DeepMind division, over top-ranked human Go players.2 Go is a 
significantly greater challenge for artificial intelligence than chess, because 
there are so many possible combinations of moves in the game that a 
computer cannot simply calculate the best strategy by brute force. The 
AlphaGo team first trained an AI system using examples of human expert 
moves, but subsequently developed AlphaGo Zero, which is based solely 
on reinforcement learning beginning with the rules of the game, without 
any human expert input.3 AlphaGo Zero went on to post a 100-0 record in 
games against the original AlphaGo, which itself had beaten human master 
Lee Sedol, winner of eighteen international championships.4 The same team 
also developed a chess-playing computer that learned the game in the same 
way, by trial-and-error, beginning with only the basic rules of the game. 
Unlike Deep Blue and other systems that used brute force to out-compute 
human players, the AlphaZero chess system “played like no computer ever 
has, intuitively and beautifully, with a romantic, attacking style.”5 Garry 
Kasparov wrote that the computer had developed its own style, not that of 
its human programmers, and it was one that “reflects the truth” about 
chess.6 
Go and chess are only games, but melanoma can be a deadly serious skin 
cancer. In a study published in May 2018, a team of researchers from 
Germany, the U.S., and France demonstrated that an artificial neural 
network, trained on images of malignant melanomas and benign moles, 
could outperform expert dermatologists at making the potentially lifesaving 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., David Etherington, Google’s AlphaGo AI Beats the World’s Best Human 
Go Player, TECHCRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/23/googles-alphago-ai-beats-the-
worlds-best-human-go-player/ (last visited May 29, 2019); David Z. Morris, Google’s Go 
Computer Beats Top-Ranked Human, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/ 
03/12/googles-go-computer-vs-human/.  
 3. See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 
NATURE 354, 354 (2017). 
 4. Id. AlphaGo Zero not only learned the strategies and techniques employed by 
human experts, but developed non-standard, but successful strategies “beyond the scope of 
traditional Go knowledge.” Id. at 357. “AlphaGo Zero rapidly progressed from entirely 
random moves towards a sophisticated understanding of Go concepts, including fuseki 
(opening), tesuji (tactics), life-and-death, ko (repeated board situations), yose (endgame), 
capturing races, sente (initiative), shape, influence and territory, all discovered from first 
principles.” Id. at 358. 
 5. Steven Strogatz, One Giant Step for a Chess-Playing Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/science/chess-artificial-intelligence.html. 
 6. Id.  
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discrimination between malignant and benign skin lesions.7 The AI system 
missed fewer malignant melanomas, and also had fewer false positives, 
misidentifying fewer benign moles as malignant. The computer’s 
performance on the images alone bettered that of the dermatologists even 
after the human physicians were given clinical information about the 
patient, including age, sex, and location of the lesion.8 The authors of the 
study suggested that dermatologists may benefit from the assistance of the 
AI system,9 but it is not difficult to imagine the consternation of human 
physicians at discovering that computers do better at one of their central 
professional tasks. 
Lawyers similarly may worry about being displaced by AI systems. 
Many of the tasks traditionally performed by lawyers involve dealing with 
large volumes of information, and computers are very good at executing 
instructions for the processing of information.10 Discovery practice, 
particularly reviewing for privileged documents, work product, and “hot 
docs,” has been revolutionized by predictive coding systems.11 AI systems 
can provide similar advantages for the transactional due diligence 
process—another traditional bane of the existence of junior associates. 
Much technology used by law firms today is used to automate “search-and-
find type tasks.”12 In addition, however, it is already possible to automate 
the production of routine legal instruments such as wills and residential real 
estate closing documents. Contract drafting software supported by machine 
learning and deep learning techniques may enable parties to create more 
sophisticated contracts without the assistance of lawyers, based on the input 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See H.A. Haenssle et al., Man Against Machine: Diagnostic Performance of a Deep 
Learning Convolutional Neural Network for Dermoscopic Melanoma Recognition in 
Comparison to 58 Dermatologists, 29 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 1836 (2018). 
 8. Id. at 1839. 
 9. Id. at 1841. 
 10. See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine 
Intelligence Will Transfer the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? 
Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 508 (2017). 
 11. Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1691, 1701-05 (2014). The California State Bar ethics committee has stated that the 
attorney’s baseline duty of competence in litigation representation requires familiarity with 
e-discovery and may, on a case-by-case basis, require higher levels of technical knowledge 
and ability. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal 
Op. 2015-193 (2015).  
 12. Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-
intelligence.html. 
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of a few key terms and conditions.13 Other tedious tasks, like periodic 
reviews by banks of commercial loan agreements, can be automated with 
considerable savings in costs to clients, but with a corresponding loss of 
jobs by lawyers. For example, JP Morgan Chase deployed an AI-based 
program that performs a periodic review of loan agreements in seconds—a 
task which previously required 360,000 hours of work per year by lawyers 
and loan officers.14 Decision-support systems employing predictive 
analytics, like LexMachina and Ravel, can help litigators and their clients 
make better strategic decisions by ferreting out subtle patterns in judicial 
decisions and predicting the odds of success on motions at various stages of 
the process.15 AI-enabled systems also have significant potential to improve 
access to the legal system for poor and middle-income clients. An app 
called DoNotPay, which allows drivers to contest parking tickets without 
the intervention of a human agent, has been touted as a harbinger of the 
transformation of self-help legal services.16 Its developer is experimenting 
with the use of the platform to enable applications for emergency housing 
assistance and even asylum in the United States or Canada for refugees.17 
It is important not to overstate the potentially disruptive impact of 
artificial intelligence on the practice of law. Different types of legal work 
vary in their susceptibility to replacement by automation.18 At least for the 
foreseeable future it seems extremely unlikely that computers will replace 
lawyers at tasks such as (1) fact investigation, including making a judgment 
about the relevant avenues of investigation, determining where relevant 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Beverly Rich, How AI Is Changing Contracts, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 12, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-ai-is-changing-contracts. 
 14. Hugh Son, JPMorgan Software Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers 360,000 
Hours, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2017, 6:31 PM CST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-02-28/jpmorgan-marshals-an-army-of-developers-to-automate-high-finance. 
An Israeli startup company called LawGeex is marketing contracts-review software to 
businesses that performs functions similar to the program used by JP Morgan Chase. See 
Steve O’Hear, LawGeex Raises $12M for Its AI-Powered Contract Review Technology, 
TECHCRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/17/lawgeex-raises-12m-for-its-ai-powered-
contract-review-technology/ (last visited May 14, 2019).  
 15. See Jason Koebler, Rise of the Robolawyers, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2017), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/rise-of-the-robolawyers/517794/; McGinnis & 
Pearce, supra note 10, at 3052-53. 
 16. See Drew Simshaw, Ethical Issues in Robo-Lawyering: The Need for Guidance on 
Developing and Using Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 173, 
174-75 (2018) (describing development and expansion of DoNotPay). 
 17. Id. at 176. 
 18. See Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA 
L. REV. DISC. 26 (2015). 
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documents are likely to be located, and interviewing witnesses;19 (2) 
negotiation over issues such as the terms on which to settle a case or 
provisions in a transaction;20 (3) the type of client counseling requiring 
emotional intelligence, such as listening empathetically to a client in a 
matrimonial dispute to determine the client’s goals, and then providing 
advice about what options are legally available;21 (4) creative, strategic 
advising or that which requires assessing not only legal risks but also taking 
into account multifaceted, ambiguous, possibly conflicting client objectives 
and interests; (5) producing written work product that does not read like it 
was written by a computer;22 (6) in-court appearances on behalf of clients, 
at a trial, evidentiary hearing, or oral argument on a motion or an appeal; or 
(7) any work in new or rapidly changing areas of law.23 Technology 
enhances the ability of lawyers to deal with large volumes of information 
and to discern patterns in what may initially appear to be attributed to 
randomness, but experienced lawyers are still required to interact with 
many types of clients and exercise judgment on their behalf. Risk-averse 
clients may rely on automation for relatively routine legal services, but will 
still prefer human lawyers for high-stakes legal matters.24 One Silicon 
Valley lawyer interviewed in the New York Times noted that the kind of 
work appropriate for a senior partner billing $1200 per hour is not 
threatened by artificial intelligence, but he did observe the potential impact 
on the work generally performed by more junior lawyers. He said: “For the 
time being, experience like mine is something people are willing to pay 
for . . . . What clients don’t want to pay for is any routine work. But . . . the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 527. 
 20. Id. at 527-29. Remus and Levy discuss a company called Modria that offers 
technology for handling relatively small disputes. It uses software that identifies “areas of 
agreement and disagreement, and makes suggestions for resolving the dispute.” Id. at 528. 
There is a significant gap, however, between the abilities of Modria’s current system and 
what would be required to negotiate larger, more complex disputes.  
 21. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR 
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 53-63 (1995) (describing the fluidity 
of client goals, objectives, and expectations, and the counseling required to match up the 
client’s conception of his or her interest with what is “realistic” or legally possible). 
 22. See Lohr, supra note 12 (describing a program from Ross Intelligence, that replies 
to a legal question in the form of a two-page memo but noting that humans must rewrite the 
computer-generated memo). 
 23. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 10, at 3042.  
 24. Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note 18, at 40 (noting that “risk aversion may trump 
technology diffusion”). 
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trouble is that technology makes more and more work routine.”25 As routine 
legal services are commodified and automated, lawyers whose bread-and-
butter work consists predominantly of routine tasks such as simple wills 
and residential real estate closings will come under considerable 
competitive pressure. 
One might of course argue that technology has not yet developed to 
handle the more complex challenges handled by the $1200 per hour partner. 
Given the history of advances in AI and the increase in computing power 
that we have seen over the last decade, however, it would be foolish to 
assume that the necessary technology will not exist soon.26 In this paper I 
would like to make a very different claim—one grounded in moral 
philosophy and reflection on the nature of law. My claim is that computers 
can never displace lawyers entirely, because legal reasoning necessarily 
involves the types of normative judgments that are impossible for AI. The 
reason is not related to current or foreseeable limitations in computing 
power or AI technology. It is related instead to a conceptual truth about 
law, namely that it purports to impose obligations or confer rights, to give 
reasons, and to change what its subjects ought to do.27 By its nature, the law 
claims authority.28 Having authority means altering the normative situation 
of a subject; it means possessing the power to change what someone else 
ought to do.29 A judge announcing a legal decision is not merely saying that 
the parties to whom it applies will be subject to contempt of court penalties 
if they disobey it (although the decision does imply the possibility of 
sanctions).30 Beyond that, the judge’s decision creates an obligation which, 
as H.L.A. Hart famously argued, is different from the compulsion to do 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Lohr, supra note 12 (quoting James Yoon, a partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & 
Rosati). John McGinnis and Russ Pearce predicted this result when they wrote in 2014 that 
“superstars in the profession will be more identifiable and will use technology to extend their 
reach.” McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 10, at 3042.  
 26. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 10, at 3043-44 (discussing the continuing 
validity of Moore’s Law, which predicts that computing power will continue to double every 
18 months, and also noting the growth of communications bandwidth and storage capacity).  
 27. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 181-82 (2011); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW 29-32 (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW]. 
 28. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 210 (1994) [hereinafter RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality]. 
 29. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 182; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 26-30 
(1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM]. 
 30. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015) (arguing that Hart 
and other canonical legal philosophers downplay the centrality of coercion in conceptual 
accounts of the nature of law).  
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something.31 An obligation implies the existence of a duty, i.e., something 
which one has a good reason of the right sort to do.32 For a reason to be of 
the right sort, and to affect the normative situation of those to whom it is 
addressed, it must express recognition of its addressee as a rational being 
capable of understanding and acknowledging the force of the reason.33 
Morality flows from the mutual recognition of one another as free and equal 
agents.34 There are computational challenges involved in modeling moral 
decision-making by human agents.35 Even if these problems were solved, 
however, it is far from clear that it is possible to produce an artificial 
system that counts as a good moral agent.36 Without a moral agent, there 
can be no law—that is the conceptual claim I will defend here. Before 
elaborating on that argument, however, it is necessary to review briefly the 
state of the art in the field of artificial, computer, or machine ethics to see 
whether an AI system can be a moral agent.37 
There are a number of ethical—in the sense of law-of-lawyering or 
professional responsibility—issues relating to artificial intelligence in the 
practice of law, which are not addressed here. These include the scope of 
malpractice liability for technology-assisted legal services,38 whether legal 
documents or advice generated by artificial intelligence constitute the 
practice of law for the purpose of state prohibitions on the unauthorized 
                                                                                                                 
 31. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 19, 82-88 (2d ed. 1994). 
 32. STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 15-16 (2006). 
 33. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2008) 
(arguing that legal authorities necessarily appeal “to people’s capacities for practical 
understanding, for self-control, and for the self-monitoring and modulation of their own 
behavior, in relation to norms that they can grasp and understand”). 
 34. DARWALL, supra note 32. See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, The Reasons 
We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral 
Values, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 275 (1996); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO 
EACH OTHER (1998). 
 35. See Wendell Wallach, Robot Minds and Human Ethics: The Need for a 
Comprehensive Model of Moral Decision Making, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 243, 244–45 
(2010). 
 36. See Colin Allen et al., Prolegomena to Any Future Artificial Moral Agent, 12 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 251 (2000) [hereinafter Allen et 
al., Prolegomena]; James H. Moor, The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine 
Ethics, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS., July/Aug. 2006, at 18, 21.  
 37. Following standard usage in philosophy, I use “ethics” and “morality” 
interchangeably. See David Copp, Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 3, 4 (David Copp ed., 2006). 
 38. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for 
Online Providers of Legal Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541, 557–58 (2015). 
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practice of law,39 and the requirements of competence, confidentiality, and 
supervision when lawyers supervise non-lawyer information technology 
providers.40 Lawyers concerned with managing their exposure to discipline 
and civil liability should obviously be well informed on the applicable law. 
The question addressed here is different in that it deals with whether it 
would be possible to create an AI system—a robo-lawyer if you will—that 
is capable of dealing with the law in the same way a human lawyer would. 
In the discussion that follows, I will assume that the current state of AI 
technology permits computer systems to perform many lawyering tasks at a 
level of competency that meets or exceeds human lawyers. Reviewing tens 
of thousands of pages of documents for privileged communications, 
scanning hundreds of contracts for relevant provisions, generating legal 
documents in response to user input, and assessing the decided cases in a 
jurisdiction to determine the likelihood of prevailing on a motion are all 
functions that human lawyers have traditionally performed, but computers 
may do better. The claim in this paper relates to what I will call the core 
lawyering function—that which makes the legal profession ethically 
distinctive in the context of a liberal democracy. The core lawyering 
function is facilitating clients’ capacity to function as free and equal 
members of a political community.41 In a liberal democracy, the legal 
system provides individuals and entities with a toolkit of rights and duties 
with respect to each other, which serve as a means of treating other 
members of the political community with respect, in light of their inherent 
dignity. The law functions by offering justifications for actions that affect 
the interests of others. In advising clients and representing them in dealing 
with others, lawyers must be prepared to offer arguments that can be 
assessed for their soundness and accepted as reason-giving by other rational 
agents. The linchpin is the idea of practical authority. In ethics, that means 
addressing a request to another to either do something or justify her refusal 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 
2011); Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Document Providers and the Public Interest: 
Using a Certification Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection, 72 
OKLA. L. REV. 91 (2019); Thomas E. Spahn, Is Your Artificial Intelligence Guilty of the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2018, at 1, 28–47. 
 40. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 
(2008) (discussing duties regarding confidentiality when outsourcing work to IT vendors); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (setting out duties 
regarding supervision of non-lawyers assisting the practice of law).  
 41. See W. Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal-Process Reasons in Attorney 
Advising, 99 B.U. L. REV. 107, 109 (2018). 
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to do so, in response to a demand for accountability.42 The practical 
authority of law comes from the claim by the legal system to create 
standards that must be adhered to by members of the political community 
because they stand for a judgment, in the name of the community as a 
whole, regarding what should be done in some respect.43 The core 
lawyering function is precisely the connection between legal authority and 
the moral demand for accountability. 
The reason to focus on the core lawyering function is that it clarifies the 
stakes in the normative debate over artificial intelligence and the law. We 
should be clear on what would be lost—in terms of values, not jobs or 
economic returns—by replacing human lawyers with computers or robots. 
II. The Current State of Machine Ethics 
As in the case of AI more generally, expert systems that participate with 
humans in activities with ethical significance have proven the capacity to 
model moral decision-making. For example, a team consisting of a 
bioethicist and a computer scientist designed an expert system called 
MedEthEx to help physicians deal with ethical issues that arise in the 
course of clinical practice.44 The program generalizes from specific cases 
involving decisions made by expert human bioethicists. It uses inductive 
logic to infer a set of consistent rules underlying the judgments human 
experts have reached concerning specific cases. The system is built around 
the assumption that ethical decision-making proceeds from a set of 
principles or duties. An influential example is David Ross’s list of prima 
facie duties, including fidelity, justice, gratitude, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and self-improvement.45 In the context of bioethics, the 
relevant principles may be those developed by Beauchamp and Childress 
(non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice), and widely 
considered the dominant theoretical framework.46 The expert system 
modeling may infer from a physician’s decision to defer to her patient’s 
refusal of life-saving treatment that respect for the patient’s autonomy 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See DARWALL, supra note 32, at 58-59.  
 43. See RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 27, at 51-52. 
 44. See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS 
RIGHT FROM WRONG 127-29 (2009) (describing MedEthEx). 
 45. See W. D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21 (1930). 
 46. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (7th ed. 2012). For the indebtedness of Beauchamp and Childress to 
Ross, see Tom L. Beauchamp, Principlism and Its Alleged Competitors, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF 
ETHICS J. 181, 183 (1995). 
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outweighs the obligation of beneficence in the relevant circumstances. 
When the system is “trained” on a sufficient number of previously decided 
cases, it develops the capability to track human judgments with a high 
degree of reliability. It therefore offers an accumulated store of experience 
to practitioners who may not have access to advice by human bioethicists. 
This short description of the MedEthEx system suggests both the 
promise and the limitations of AI in ethical decision-making. First, it is 
important to see that the system begins with a training set of cases labeled 
with human judgments indicating which decision is morally correct.47 This 
inductive approach is an alternative to using abstract rules for the selection 
of ethically appropriate outcomes, reasoning from the top down.48 
Candidates for these general rules include the Ten Commandments, the 
Kantian Categorical Imperative, or the utilitarian calculus, and of course the 
first question that occurs to many people thinking about machine ethics is 
whether an AI system should be oriented toward a particular religious or 
philosophical conception of morality.49 Beyond the obvious problem of 
specifying the content of morality at the most general level, the top-down 
approach runs into a number of significant difficulties. The decision in a 
particular case may involve a conflict between two or more rules on a list. 
These conflicts are “computationally intractable” without some higher-
order rule or principle that resolves the conflict.50 There may also be 
instances in which violating a rule is permissible, but again some additional 
principle is required to determine when exceptions are to be allowed.51 
Even in the absence of conflicts among rules, a decision-making procedure 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Vincent Conitzer et al., Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial 
Intelligence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 4831 (Satinder P. Singh & Shaul Markovitch eds., 2017), https://aaai.org/ 
ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14651/13991. 
 48. See Colin Allen et al., Artificial Morality: Top-Down, Bottom-Up, and Hybrid 
Approaches, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 149, 150 (2005) [hereinafter Allen et al., Artificial 
Morality]. 
 49. See Wendell Wallach et al., Machine Morality: Bottom-Up and Top-Down 
Approaches for Modeling Human Moral Faculties, 22 AI & SOC’Y 565, 567 (2008) (“Should 
the systems’ decisions and actions conform to religiously or philosophically inspired value 
systems, such as Christian, Buddhist, utilitarian, or other sources of social norms? The kind 
of morality people wish to implement will suggest radical differences in the underlying 
structure of the systems in which computer scientists implement that morality.”). 
 50. Allen et al., Artificial Morality, supra note 48, at 150. Faced with the problem of 
conflicting prima facie duties, Ross quotes Aristotle as maintaining “the decision rests with 
perception” and states that the agent’s action should be “preceded and informed by the 
fullest reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings.” ROSS, supra note 45, at 42. 
 51. Allen et al., Prolegomena, supra note 36, at 254. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/3
2019]    PROMISE & LIMITATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 31 
 
 
or system must face application questions. For example, to apply the 
principle “do no harm,” one must be able to specify what counts as a harm. 
A harm may be defined as a setback to one’s interests, but this merely 
pushes the question back another level: What interests are others ethically 
obligated to avoid interfering with? Not every desire rises to the level of an 
interest; not every unpleasant occurrence is a harm; and not every setback 
to one’s interests is unjustified.52 A great deal of moral discernment must go 
into determining the application of the seemingly straightforward harm 
principle. Similarly, the utilitarian calculus runs into familiar difficulties. It 
directs agents to lead to the greater realization (or maximize, or satisfice) 
the good, but the good must be specified as hedonic pleasure; higher or 
lower pleasures (Bentham’s famous line about push-pin being as good as 
poetry); satisfaction of preferences (whether actual preferences or those that 
are fully informed or well considered); or something objective and 
independent of contingent psychological desires. One must further consider 
whether it is the good for humans or all sentient creatures, whether some 
things are good apart from the contribution they make to the lives of human 
beings, and whether it is permissible to limit the obligation to promote only 
the well-being of those creatures the agent has in her power to affect.53 
More subtle ethical principles conceal even more difficult challenges. 
Suppose an AI system is programmed to regard violations of the 
Categorical Imperative as moral wrongs. On one version (the Formula of 
Universal Law), the morally right action is that which is according to a 
maxim (or principle) that one can will that it should be a universal law.54 It 
is by now a standard observation that acts may fall under many 
descriptions,55 so what is the maxim that is subjected to the test of 
universalizability? One answer—though by no means the only one—is that 
the proper act-description is given by what the agent intended by the action, 
which is consistent with Kant’s usage of the term “maxim.”56 But then how 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 31-51 (1984) (considering the relationship among harms, wrongs, and 
interests). 
 53. See, e.g., David O. Brink, Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 37, at 381, 381–83; WALLACH & 
ALLEN, supra note 44, at 87-89. 
 54. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *421 (James W. 
Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 2d ed., 1981) (1785). 
 55. See, e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958). 
 56. See ONORA O’NEILL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE: AN ESSAY ON KANTIAN ETHICS 13-15 
(2d ed. 2013).  
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would a computer have access to the motives behind any given action,57 
even assuming that people were sincere or reliable reporters of their own 
motives? In addition, a problem familiar to Kant scholars is determining 
when a maxim cannot be generalized without contradiction. Is the test one 
of logical contradiction or a practical one, looking at whether actions would 
frustrate their own purpose if performed?58 Kant’s example of a maxim that 
cannot be generalized as a universal law is breaking a promise to repay a 
debt; the idea is that if everyone did this, the practice of lending money 
would break down because no one would believe in another’s promise to 
repay.59 Returning to the earlier observation, however, acts cannot be 
generalized, only the principles underlying them, and if any given act 
exemplifies numerous principles, what should be the computer test for 
universalizability?60 This is a very tough nut to crack for moral 
philosophers, and would appear to be an obstacle to modeling compliance 
with the Categorical Imperative. 
The theoretical and computational challenges seem insurmountable for a 
top-down, theory-driven approach to machine ethics. At the very least, 
careful reflection, and probably also training in ethical theory, would be 
required to specify the goal for the system.61 Bottom-up approaches 
therefore seem promising.62 Bottom-up design in the context of artificial 
ethical systems means that the designer does not begin with an explicit 
ethical theory, bypassing many of the questions just raised. What must be 
specified, however, is some kind of performance measure so that engineers 
can tinker with the system to approach or exceed the required benchmark.63 
The system may then be turned loose in a structured environment populated 
by other entities with whom the system may interact. Experiments have 
been conducted with iterated prisoner’s dilemma games or similar 
environments in which the evolving behavior of artificial systems can be 
observed.64 Some machine ethicists have proposed a Moral Turing Test, in 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Allen et al., Artificial Morality, supra note 48, at 150.  
 58. See CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS, supra note 34, at 77, 77–78. 
 59. KANT, supra note 54, at *422. 
 60. O’NEILL, supra note 56, at 60-61.  
 61. See Allen et al., Artificial Morality, supra note 48, at 150, 152. 
 62. See Susan Leigh Anderson, Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” and Machine 
Metaethics, 22 AI & SOC’Y 477, 482 (2008) (citing W.D. Ross and the problem of conflicts 
of duties, but then arguing that it is possible “that a decision procedure could be learned 
from generalizing from intuitions about correct answers in particular cases”). 
 63. Wallach et al., supra note 49, at 569. 
 64. WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 44, at 101-04. 
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which humans have conversations, presumably in writing, about ethics with 
either a human or a machine, and must identify their interlocutor “at a [level 
of accuracy] above chance.”65 A bottom-up approach, evaluated using a 
Moral Turing Test, might “treat[] normative values as being implicit in the 
activity of agents rather than explicitly articulated (or even articulable) in 
terms of a general theory.”66 But this would be a rather undemanding 
version of the Turing Test. As the test’s originators rightly note, one might 
also expect one’s interlocutor to be able to articulate moral judgments and 
the reasons underlying them.67 An ethical action must be justified by 
sufficient grounds, and in ethical discourse one might expect to be required 
to make explicit the reasons for one’s action and their adequacy to warrant 
the belief that the action is morally justified. Thus, a Moral Turing Test 
should require demonstrated competence in explaining the reasons for a 
decision or action, not the action alone. 
One difficulty with the Moral Turing Test is that it does not avoid 
contested issues in normative ethics and metaethics. For example, Mill 
believed that motivation was irrelevant to the morality of actions, and “[h]e 
who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, 
whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble.”68 
Kant, on the other hand, argued that only acts undertaken for the sake of 
duty have moral worth. In his shopkeeper example, Kant argued that 
charging a fair price does not have moral worth because it was done out of 
the shopkeeper’s self-interest in not acquiring a reputation for dishonesty.69 
In normative ethics, a committed believer in the rights of non-human 
animals (Peter Singer, for example) would insist that the suffering of all 
sentient creatures be taken into account in a utilitarian calculus, while other 
philosophers would count only the pleasure and pain of humans. One 
response to this difficulty would be to stipulate as part of the Moral Turing 
Test that disagreement about either the justification of ethical judgments or 
the content of those judgments is consistent with competence in ethical 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Allen et al., Prolegomena, supra note 36, at 254.  
 66. Wallach et al., supra note 49, at 569.  
 67. Allen et al., Prolegomena, supra note 36, at 254.  
 68. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 24 (Oskar Priest ed., Liberal Arts Press 1957) 
(1863). 
 69. KANT, supra note 54, at *397. The idea is that moral worth is connected with 
rational necessity, and the connection between the shopkeeper’s actions and his reasons for 
acting is contingent on the overlap between honesty and his professional success. See also 
Jens Timmermann, Acting from Duty: Inclination, Reason and Moral Worth, in KANT’S 
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: A CRITICAL GUIDE 45, 47-48 (Jens 
Timmermann ed., 2009). 
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decision-making. If we do not expect agreement among human 
decisionmakers—even those with training in moral philosophy—than it is 
unrealistic to expect more from a machine. 
In engineering terms, a bottom-up approach to problem-solving 
contemplates the iterated development of discrete subsystems that work 
together to accomplish the specified goal, such as passing the Moral Turing 
Test. As three leading machine ethicists have observed, computer scientists 
are working on subsystems that are capable of modeling particular skills 
and capacities that are relevant to moral decision-making.70 However, the 
task of designing an integrated artificial moral decision-making system is 
complicated by our still rapidly developing understanding of how human 
moral decision-making actually works. For example, picking out the 
morally salient features of a situation is a complex capacity that may 
proceed largely unconsciously, and is probably supported by emotional 
intelligence as well as theoretical reasoning.71 (Hume, of course, made 
emotions such as sympathy and trust central to his ethical theory.72) 
Jonathan Haidt’s work has shown that many moral judgments begin with 
intuitions—relatively fast, automatic, affective responses—and are 
supported only after the fact with reasoning that is backfilled to fit the 
judgment already reached on the basis of unconscious factors.73 Emotions 
also provide important channels for acquiring information relevant to moral 
decision-making.74 The human ability to intuit the affective states of 
others—whether it is pain, fear, surprise, humiliation, anger, disgust, or 
another emotion—is essential to our ability to direct one’s actions in an 
appropriate way. Emotional intelligence is also important in assessing the 
intentions of others, and if moral evaluation requires taking intentions into 
account (as it may on a Kantian approach), then a system that is fully 
competent as an artificial moral agent would require the capacity to 
interpret behavior in light of intentions.75 The field of affective computing 
is in its infancy,76 and significant progress in this discipline may be required 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Wallach et al., supra note 49, at 570.  
 71. See Wendell Wallach, Implementing Moral Decision Making Faculties in 
Computers and Robots, 22 AI & SOC’Y 463, 469 (2008).  
 72. See Annette Baier, Hume’s Place in the History of Ethics, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS 399 (Roger Crisp ed., 2013). 
 73. Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCIENCE 998, 998 
(2007); see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, 108 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 814 (2001). 
 74. WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 44, at 140-41. 
 75. Id. at 141. 
 76. Id. at 152-53. 
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before an AI system can attain the competency required to be an artificial 
moral agent. It is likely that a bottom-up approach to machine ethics will 
involve subsystems that are capable of dealing with the affective as well as 
the cognitive demands of moral decision-making. 
III. The Relationship Between Law and Morality and What It Has 
to Do with AI 
One who believes in the potential of artificial intelligence to take over 
the core lawyering function of advising and representing clients within the 
law has several possible responses to the current state of AI moral decision-
making. The first is to deny the need for moral decision-making in 
connection with the interpretation and application of law. As discussed in 
Section III.A, below, that is a mischaracterization of legal positivism, to say 
nothing of anti-positivism. No matter what theory about the nature of law to 
which one subscribes, moral decision-making is inevitable. The second, and 
a weaker position, would be to assert that AI systems may be able to predict 
human ethical judgments, even if they are not yet capable of making them. 
That is a more challenging argument and will be taken up in Section III.B. 
A. Is Moral Decision-making Part of Law? 
The legal positivist has a thesis about the relationship between law and 
policy considerations: they are separable.77 A norm may be part of a system 
called “law” without satisfying a demand that it be just, efficient, wise, or in 
conformity with the requirements of morality. A different way to say the 
same thing is to insist that only social facts can count in favor of a 
conclusion that some norm is law. As John Gardner puts it, it must be 
possible to recognize law based “on its sources, not its merits.”78 On one 
version of positivism, expounded by H.L.A. Hart, law is defined as the 
union of primary and secondary rules.79 Primary rules are directed at 
citizens and purport to permit, prohibit, or regulate conduct.80 Criminal 
prohibitions are an obvious example of primary rules, but there are myriad 
other types, including rules of civil liability, statutes and administrative 
regulations concerning matters such as workplace discrimination and food 
safety, and legal norms that provide a toolkit for private ordering, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS 
AND THE LAW 3, 5 (1988). 
 78. John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199 (2001). 
 79. HART, supra note 31, at 94. 
 80. See id.  
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rules governing contracts, wills and trusts, and the formation and 
governance of corporations. Secondary rules are second-order “rules about 
rules,” establishing norm-governed patterns of creating or changing laws, 
adjudicating disputes that arise under primary rules and, most importantly, 
sorting out which norms are a part of the law and which belong solely to 
some other normative domain, such as morality, custom, etiquette, or the 
rules of some non-legal institution such as a club or a university faculty. 
Hart refers to this latter type of secondary rule as a “rule of recognition,” 
and it is the linchpin in his theory.81 A rule of recognition specifies some 
feature or property of another rule by which it is shown to be legally 
authoritative.82 (Dworkin calls these characteristics the “pedigree” of the 
rule.83) In the United States, for example, if a text is passed by both Houses 
of Congress and signed by the President, the proposition it states becomes a 
source of law. 
Legal positivism appears to avoid the problems discussed above, 
concerning the ability of AI systems to make (or model) moral judgments. 
If legal validity is a property of the behavior of judges, legislators, and 
other legal officials, nothing from the domain of morality need be 
incorporated into legal decision-making. However, this tidy story is 
complicated by a couple of considerations. First, there is no reason to 
believe that positivism must be exclusive—that is, that it cannot and does 
not incorporate moral considerations into legal decision-making. Second, 
even exclusive positivism requires lawyers and judges to make judgments 
that may be difficult for AI systems to make or model, for many of the 
same reasons that moral judgments are challenging for computers. 
Inclusive positivists contend that moral criteria can figure in tests of 
legal validity, as long as the relevant social practices assign them that role.84 
Moral evaluation can therefore play a role in determining what the law is, 
as long as there is a conventional practice among the relevant officials (such 
as judges) of referring to moral criteria in making decisions about what the 
law is. Legal standards that have cognates in moral analysis, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 94-95. 
 83. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 40 (1977) (from chapter 2, “The 
Model of Rules I”). 
 84. For this phrasing of the definition of inclusive positivism, see Scott Hershovitz, The 
End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1166 (2015). See also Jules Coleman, Authority 
and Reason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 287, 289 (Robert George ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
Coleman, Authority and Reason] (defining “incorporationism” as the claim that a rule of 
recognition can incorporate the community’s morality into its law). 
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reasonable care in tort law, or unconscionability as a defense to the 
enforcement of contracts, have long since been incorporated into legal 
reasoning; they have social pedigrees.85 A familiar example of inclusive 
positivist analysis would be the conventional practice of seeking to 
determine whether, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, it is really 
cruel and unusual to execute children or people with mental disabilities. 
Supreme Court decisions that refer to evolving standards of decency and 
consider the proportionality of capital punishment and the culpability of the 
offender are examples of inclusive positivist reasoning.86 In jurisprudential 
terms, the moral evaluation that, say, executing children is cruel and 
unusual is a proposition of law as well as morality in virtue of a 
conventional practice of incorporating that evaluation into legal judgments.  
Exclusive positivists, by contrast, maintain that legal validity “cannot 
turn on matters of substance, moral or other.”87 What about the judge 
deciding an Eighth Amendment case, and concluding that executing 
juveniles is cruel and unusual? An exclusive positivist judge may also look 
to moral standards, such as decency and culpability, when deciding an 
Eighth Amendment issue. The difference is that the exclusive positivist 
judge would frankly concede that she is engaging in moral reasoning unless 
the principles upon which the decision rests have been “accepted and 
practiced by officials from the internal point of view.”88 In tort cases, for 
example, there is a conventional rule permitting judges to make reference to 
moralized conceptions of reasonableness. An exclusive positivist would 
have no difficulty concluding that, for example, it was unreasonable for a 
foreign-exchange program not to monitor more closely a high-school 
student’s relationship with her host family to ensure that no sexual 
misconduct was occurring in the home.89 The only real difference between 
inclusive and exclusive positivism is that the inclusive positivist judge 
would contend that the law permits reference to reasonableness in the moral 
sense, while an exclusive positivist would claim that her role as judge 
permits her sometimes to do what is morally the right thing, even if the law 
does not prescribe one resolution or the other. 
Different flavors of anti-positivism of course involve more direct 
connections between law and morality. An anti-positivist would contend 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See HART, supra note 31, at 271. 
 86. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 87. Coleman, Authority and Reason, supra note 84, at 290.  
 88. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 269. 
 89. See Beul v. ASSE Int’l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000).  
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that, in order to ascertain the content of the law, it is necessary to “point to 
some normative facts alongside the social facts.”90 Classical natural law 
theory directs a judge to consider whether a would-be law is in fact an 
“ordinance of reason for the common good, made by [a ruler] who has care 
of the community.”91 Dworkin’s distinctive anti-positivist position presents 
judges with the herculean task of determining how a decision should fit 
with past political acts, including the enactment of statutes by the 
legislature and prior judicial decisions, while also explaining how the 
decision “figure[s] in or follow[s] from the principles of justice, fairness, 
and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation 
of the community’s legal practice.”92 In his now somewhat shopworn 
example of Riggs v. Palmer, the beneficiary of a will was denied the right 
to obtain his bequest because he had murdered the testator.93 The court in 
that case based its decision on the principle, “no person should profit from 
his or her own wrongdoing,” which is a reasonable enough maxim of 
morality, but cannot be subsumed under a Hartian rule of recognition.94 
Dworkin argues that “legal principles exist which determine the right 
answer to the legal question at issue.”95 It is essential to understand that he 
believes Riggs, the murdering-heir case, to have a right answer as a matter 
of law. Judges do not have the discretion to decide the case according to 
their own beliefs about morality, because they do not look only to social 
facts to determine the right resolution of disputes, but to the morality of the 
political community of which they are a part. Because judges rely on non-
legal standards in deciding cases, positivism cannot be an apt description of 
law.96 Evaluative judgments are required in the dimension of fit as well as, 
more obviously, in the dimension of justification, and these judgments 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Hershovitz, supra note 84, at 1166.  
 91. THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 10 (William P. 
Baumgarth et al. eds., Richard J. Regan trans., 2d ed. 2002). 
 92. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986). 
 93. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 188–89 (N.Y. 1889). 
 94. Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125, 
152 (Jules Coleman ed., 2013). 
 95. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 263. 
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cannot be accounted for using the Hartian idea of conventionally practiced 
social rules. 
Even if one believed that exclusive positivism offered the best theoretical 
account of the concept of law (e.g. for reasons given by Raz97), and also 
insisted, implausibly, that judges may not make reference to extra-legal 
moral considerations, AI systems must nevertheless contend with the 
inevitable presence of judgment in legal decision-making. Hart recognized 
that positivism was vulnerable to the superficial but nevertheless plausible 
charge that it entailed a formalistic or mechanical approach to adjudication. 
He famously distinguished between cases lying near the core of the settled 
meaning of a rule and those farther out within the rule’s penumbra.98 More 
generally, as a matter of logic and language, rules cannot provide for their 
own interpretation.99 The application of legal rules depends on criteria of 
relevant that “depend on many complex factors,” including the purpose that 
can be attributed to the rule;100 the notion that when fashioning a rule it is 
impossible for a judge or legislator to foresee all the circumstances of its 
application in the future;101 and the fact that any rule can be read broadly or 
narrowly, depending on standards such as the materiality of facts to the 
prior decision, which themselves are indeterminate.102 Judges and lawyers 
have discretion in the application of rules, and the vice of formalistic legal 
theories is the attempt to disavow or disguise the necessity of the exercise 
of discretion.103 None of these observations depends on the relevance of 
moral judgments to the content of law. But legal interpretation and 
application does, in all but the core of settled meaning of rules, require the 
exercise of judgment. 
One of Dworkin’s examples in Law’s Empire illustrates the centrality of 
judgment, though not necessarily moral judgment, in legal decision-
                                                                                                                 
 97. RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, supra note 28, at 210.  
 98. HART, supra note 31, at 126.  
 99. Id. (“Particular fact-situations do not await us already marked off from each other, 
and labelled as instances of the general rule . . . .”). 
 100. Id. at 127.  
 101. Id. at 133.  
 102. Id. at 130, 134.  
 103. Id. at 129. Interestingly, given what was said above about the necessity of discretion 
along the axes of fit and justification, Shapiro sees Dworkin’s critique of Hart, with its 
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issue. Id. at 263.  
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making. He writes about a decision from the English House of Lords 
permitting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a 
plaintiff who did not contemporaneously observe an accident causing 
serious physical harm to members of her family, but heard the news, and 
rushed to the hospital to see her injured loved ones.104 American lawyers 
know of similar cases from the California Supreme Court, such as Dillon v. 
Legg105 and Thing v. LaChusa.106 In all of these cases, the result depends on 
the resolution of a number of considerations such as black-letter legal 
doctrine, such as the foreseeability of an injury; norms governing the 
interpretation of legal principles, such as the preference for bright line rules 
and ex ante certainty; and “policy” arguments such as the concern that 
emotional distress is easily feigned or exaggerated. Dworkin insists that a 
judge can decide that case only by finding the interpretation of precedent 
cases that yields a coherent set of principles about justice, fairness, and due 
process that are contained within the precedents,107 and which shows the 
political history of the community in its best light, morally speaking.108 One 
need not agree with Dworkin that the decision turns on matters of political 
morality to acknowledge that there is unlikely to be any higher-order 
principle that synthesizes the considerations bearing on the decision in a 
coherent way.109 Some decisionmakers are likely to prefer the result that 
awards full compensation to the plaintiff for her emotional distress, either 
because of a judgment that the injury deserves compensation, or for the 
instrumental reason that allowing recovery for emotional distress damages 
will further the deterrent function of tort law. Other judges may give greater 
weight to the rule-of-law considerations of limiting the discretion of judges 
and juries by insisting on a clear, easily administrable rule (such as the 
requirement that the plaintiff have been physically present at the scene of 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See DWORKIN, supra note 83, at 23-29 (discussing McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1 
AC 410 (Eng.)). 
 105. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 106. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 
 107. DWORKIN, supra note 83, at 243. 
 108. Id. at 248-49.  
 109. Dworkin’s analogy of a chain novel, in which successive judges are like the authors 
of successive chapters in a novel, may appear to make this type of decision more tractable 
for an AI system. As Stanley Fish has argued, however, preceding chapters in a chain novel 
cannot fully constrain what the novel will eventually become; subsequent interpreters always 
have freedom to, for example, characterize what has gone before as a social satire or a 
comedy of manners. Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and 
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the accident and closely related to the victim), as opposed to a more open-
ended standard such as whether severe emotional distress was reasonably 
foreseeable. 
At least as the technology currently exists, AI systems do not cope well 
with multiple sources of legal authority (including materials such as the 
interpretive rules, guidance, and policy statements that typify administrative 
governance), persuasive authority such dicta and out-of-state law, analogies 
between cases that are not factually similar but which would be recognized 
by a human decisionmaker, the wide range of factual variations among 
legally similar cases, and anomalous cases that do not fit the patterns on 
which the system was trained.110 An AI system would have considerable 
difficulty replicating human decision-making in a case like Dworkin’s 
example, which is something any first-year student in torts should be able 
to deal with easily. However, the point of this example is not to critique the 
state of existing technology; rather, it is to show that hard cases are not hard 
for computers because of any specifically moral content to law. As a matter 
of jurisprudence, it tells against Dworkin’s example that an appellate judge 
deciding the case would reason in exactly the same manner, regardless of 
her prior commitment to exclusive positivism, inclusive positivism, or 
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. Thus, any gap between human and 
robot lawyers and judges revealed by cases like this does not turn on the 
relationship between law and morality. 
B. Legal Prediction vs. Legal Authority 
The obvious response to this pattern of argument is to differentiate the 
resolution of hard or marginal cases from the great majority of legal 
decisions made by lawyers and judges. Even Hart, for whom a conventional 
rule of recognition is central, concedes that sometimes the law may run out, 
in which case judges are forced to legislate in the gaps, creating new law.111 
After a case like the one described above is resolved by the state’s highest 
court, a few application questions may remain, but eventually cases decided 
by lower courts fall into relatively predictable patterns. Certain categories 
of plaintiffs will be deemed sufficiently closely related to the victim to be 
entitled to recover for emotional distress, and it will become clear what 
counts as “close enough” to the accident scene to make the distress 
reasonably foreseeable. An AI system can be trained on a data set 
consisting of decided lower-court cases, and after the law has had an 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note 18, at 42-44. 
 111. See HART, supra note 31, at 145. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
42 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:21 
 
 
opportunity to develop, will probably do a pretty good job predicting the 
outcomes of cases given facts about the relationship between the plaintiff 
and the victim, and the location of the plaintiff relative to the accident site. 
But notice a tacit premise in this response, which is pervasive when 
thinking about AI systems potentially replacing lawyers. The premise is 
that a legal judgment, which would serve as the underpinning of legal 
advice to a client concerning the lawfulness of a proposed course of action, 
is nothing more than a prediction concerning how courts would resolve the 
issue if it were litigated. This premise has a long history within American 
jurisprudence. Early in his career, Karl Llewellyn wrote that “[w]hat . . . 
officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.”112 And Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., notoriously told an audience of law students that if 
their clients asked what the law required them to do, they were really 
asking about the likelihood of detection and punishment.113 If the law really 
is nothing more than a prediction, then we have probably already arrived at 
a time when technology is capable of equaling or surpassing the 
performance of human lawyers at predicting legal judgments. Legal 
decision-support systems already offer fast, accurate analysis of the 
expected results of particular types of motions before particular judges. But 
those predictions do not, and cannot, have the status of law. They are 
suggestions of what the law might be, but the law, by its nature, is a means 
for humans to offer reasons to one another, in response to the circumstances 
of encountering one another as equal and mutually accountable.114 The law 
is a means for giving the types of reasons that human moral agents owe to 
one another, in response to others’ demands for accountability. 
I have given a more elaborate defense of this view elsewhere.115 Briefly 
summarizing for present purposes, the argument is that morality is a matter 
of “what we owe each other.”116 What we owe to each other is 
accountability. We have the standing to address demands to one another, to 
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 113. See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897) 
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 114. DARWALL, supra note 32, at 101.  
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either act or refrain from acting in some manner that affects our interests, or 
to give reasons for refusing that demand. In Stephen Darwall’s example of 
an everyday relationship of authority, one person says to another, “hey, 
you’re stepping on my toe and it hurts—move your foot!”117 This 
seemingly simple example actually reveals something deep and important 
about the grounds of moral obligations. The fundamentally intersubjective 
nature of demand for accountability, issued by one free and equal person to 
another, places conditions on the types of reasons that may be given in 
response. Those reasons are not external—that is, they do not pertain to 
outcomes or the state of the world; rather, they must be relational.118 Why? 
Because the authority to demand accountability presupposes that addresser 
and addressee of reasons share a point of view.119 As Christine Korsgaard 
has argued, the authority of morality proceeds from our practical identity 
that gives rise to reasons and obligations.120 Valuing ourselves under a 
description—a practical identity—involves recognizing the reasons that we 
share with others. As Korsgaard puts it, the reasons of others have a 
standing with ourselves on a par with the reasons we have.121 Addressing a 
demand for accountability to another forces that person to acknowledge the 
value of the addresser’s humanity, and thus her status a self-originating 
source of value.122 
The further premise, connecting law with the relationship of authority 
and accountability among free and equal persons, is that law provides a 
means for making and complying with these demands for accountability in 
a complex, pluralistic society. People who seek to cooperate and engage in 
mutually beneficial activities require some way of not only coordinating 
action but also acknowledging others’ entitlement to be treated as free and 
equal—that is, their second-personal authority. Law has the moral aim of 
rectifying the problems of a community in which people demand 
accountability from others but are prevented by uncertainty and 
disagreement, or even simply the scale and complexity of a modern society, 
from giving sufficient reasons in the kind of idealized face-to-face 
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encounter imagined by moral philosophers.123 The authority of law, which 
is to say its capacity to furnish reasons that satisfy the moral demand for 
accountability, depends on its serving the human need to comply with the 
requirements of morality.124 
AI systems may assist lawyers in carrying out their obligations to clients 
and non-clients. It would undoubtedly be useful in many cases for a lawyer 
to have a clear picture of how different judges decide motions on various 
grounds. At the heart of the social role of lawyer, however, is the function 
of supporting the moral aim of the law, which is to furnish reasons that 
satisfy the demand for accountability that exists in a society of free and 
equal persons. What I have referred to as the core lawyering function is 
involved when lawyers (1) advise clients that the law permits them to 
undertake some course of action (the compliance role); (2) draft contracts, 
deeds, wills, trust instruments, or other documents that have the effect of 
altering the legal rights of clients and those with whom they interact (the 
private ordering role); counseling clients on how best to achieve their 
objectives within the limitations of the law (the planning role); and (5) 
certify expressly or implicitly to a court that they are asserting a position in 
litigation that has adequate factual and legal support (the role as officer of 
the court). Predictions of future judicial decisions and summaries of 
precedents may assist lawyers in carrying out these tasks. But the 
distinctive contribution of lawyers to the process is the judgment that a 
client has a legally sufficient reason for an action. Lawyers manifest the 
authority of law in their interactions with clients and others by giving 
reasons that addressees can acknowledge from the standpoint shared by free 
and equal persons.125 Here is a crucial point that sometimes goes 
unrecognized in theoretical legal ethics: The practical authority of law 
depends on its being administered by public and quasi-public officials—
that is, judges and lawyers—who are subject to requirements of 
professional role morality that orient their actions to the moral aim of law. 
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Law is not self-administering or self-interpreting. It depends for its efficacy 
and therefore its authority on appropriate conduct by human agents.126 
This observation suggests the response to an objection that may have 
occurred to many readers. The functional account of law set out here relies 
on an encounter between two people who meet, literally or metaphorically 
in the public square, and establish a relationship of authority and 
accountability. A political community can be seen as a massively scaled-up 
version of Darwall’s example of people stepping on each other’s toes. 
Those people require some means of making authoritative demands and 
responding with the right sorts of reasons. However, it is not obvious that 
the law is the only means available to people who encounter each other and 
need to deal with disagreements. I have argued that law is a technology, or 
a means for addressing and responding to demands for accountability. But 
other technologies are available. What difference does it make if two people 
decide to resolve a dispute by flipping a coin, consulting chicken entrails, or 
using a Magic 8-Ball?127 And, if they can use a Magic 8-Ball, what would 
be wrong with using some kind of AI-enabled online dispute resolution 
system? There is no need for that system to have all of the properties and 
virtues of human law if it is merely a more elaborate version of any other 
system two people might employ to resolve disputes. 
The response to this objection is that most of law does not work like a 
case in which two parties consent to resolve a dispute using a coin toss, the 
Magic 8-Ball, or an online dispute resolution system. The relationship 
between consent and authority is a bit subtle, and confusion may result 
from the influence of the conception of authority defended by Joseph Raz. 
He gives the example of “two people who refer a dispute to an 
arbitrator.”128 The arbitrator resolves the dispute and gives reasons 
supporting the decision. Importantly, the arbitrator’s decision should be 
based on the reasons that apply in any event to the disputing parties. That is 
not to say that the parties may challenge the arbitrator’s decision as not 
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correctly reflecting the balance of preexisting reasons.129 In fact, the whole 
point of seeking an authoritative decision is that the arbitrator’s decision 
furnishes a new reason that replaces or preempts the reasons brought by the 
parties to the dispute. The authoritative decision of the arbitrator is 
dependent upon the parties’ preexisting reasons, but preempts those 
dependent reasons. “[R]easons that could have been relied upon to justify 
action before [the arbitrator’s] decision cannot be relied upon once the 
decision is given.”130 This dual relationship of dependence and preemption 
is central to the Razian picture of authority. 
I very much intend to rely on Raz’s account of legal authority, as I have 
done in previous work.131 It is the linchpin of the conceptual argument 
against the possibility of robo-lawyers or robo-judges fully displacing 
human agents in those roles. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge a 
potentially misleading feature of Raz’s arbitration example. The authority 
of an arbitrator requires the consent of the parties. In the U.S., the Federal 
Arbitration Act makes arbitration fundamentally a matter of contract; the 
Supreme Court has been very willing to enforce arbitration provisions in 
contracts, even if the practical consequence is to preclude the litigation of 
certain types of claims.132 Much law, by contrast, operates non-
consensually. Practical authority, by definition, means altering the 
normative situation of its subjects. It is easy to understand an arbitrator’s 
authority given consensually as the autonomous choice of a rational agent 
to agree to abide by the decision of a neutral party.133 Law, however, often 
operates non-consensually, even coercively.134 The social contract tradition, 
associated with thinkers like John Locke, and made familiar in American 
political ideals through the language of the Declaration of Independence, 
holds that political authority depends on the consent of the governed.135 As 
Hume and countless other critics have pointed out, however, no government 
of a modern state has been founded without some “usurpation or 
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conquest.”136 With the exception of naturalized citizens who take an oath of 
allegiance to their adopted home, most residents of a nation-state never give 
express consent to be bound by the state’s laws; they are simply born within 
the state’s territorial jurisdiction. Locke responded by attempting to infer 
tacit consent from a wide variety of ways in which people actively or 
passively participate in a society.137 However, tacit consent theories have 
not fared much better in the history of debates over political authority. It is 
generally accepted that mere acquiescence to authority does not constitute 
consent unless the person purportedly giving consent has a readily available 
means of dissent which can be performed at little cost, will be respected by 
the would-be authority, and will not be an occasion for retaliation against 
the dissenter.138 People may obey law out of habit or a sense of reverence 
that has been inculcated through mandatory rituals of conformity, such as 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in school as children. Some may be 
attracted to the slogan “America—love it or leave it,” but most American 
citizens do not have a meaningful exit option due to a lack of financial 
resources, language proficiency, or job skills that would permit them to 
emigrate from their native country (to say nothing of the substantial burden 
of leaving behind one’s family and community to live as an expatriate). 
Raz himself is a skeptic regarding legal authority.139 The argument 
briefly summarized above goes beyond what Raz himself would accept, but 
I believe it is a sound case for the authority of law in a political community 
that perceives the need to establish means to plan and coordinate conduct 
when individuals are unable to resolve conflict due to complexity, 
uncertainty, and pluralism.140 The important point is that law, by its nature, 
claims authority. If one believes that law cannot make good on this claim, 
then there is little to distinguish a human lawyer from any other human who 
makes predictions about when coercive means will be applied to force 
someone to do something. As Hart showed in his critique of Austin, 
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however, there can be no legal obligation without the acceptance of the law 
as creating obligations, and therefore reasons—that is, serving as a practical 
authority.141 If one sees the function of law as enabling individuals to give 
reasons to others, in response to a demand for accountability, then the role 
of lawyers becomes clear: They serve clients by assisting them in providing 
reasons that appropriately refer to the public authorization of their actions 
by law.142 
IV. Conclusion 
At least as the technology currently exists, no artificial system has the 
standing that is presupposed by the giving of legal reasons. AI may 
someday be able to emulate or model human moral reasoning, but what it 
can never do is be a free and equal person, in a second-person relationship 
with another free and equal person. Without the relationship of 
accountability and authority, the law cannot create obligations and reasons 
for action. The capacity of legal rules and principles to furnish reasons, 
create obligations, and possess authority all depends on the shared 
standpoint of mutual respect adopted by free and equal persons. A computer 
system or a robot lawyer could perhaps emulate a human lawyer, but it 
would lack the authority necessary to function as a lawyer. The core 
lawyering function, by its nature, is suitable only for human agents. 
Lawyers do many things outside their core function, however, and the legal 
profession has already witnessed disruption from the replacement of human 
lawyers with artificial systems in tasks like privilege reviews in discovery. 
The claim in this paper is unlikely to provide comfort to lawyers facing 
displacement in these non-core functions. But a world of robot lawyers is 
not on the horizon either—not because of limitations of existing or 
foreseeable technology, but owing to the dependency of law on 
relationships of authority and accountability. 
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It may be that technology will advance one day to the point that artificial 
general intelligence exists that is reflectively self-conscious, values itself as 
a rational being, understands that other rational beings have value in the 
same way, and shares a practical evaluative standpoint which can serve as 
the foundation of reasons given to other rational beings in justification of 
actions that affect their interests. The theoretical foundations of the position 
defended here are basically Kantian. What matters for Kant is pure rational 
agency, and that may be something that computers eventually achieve. If 
that happens—if AI systems become self-originating sources of value and 
bearers of dignity—then there would no longer be any objection to them 
serving as lawyers or judges. 
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